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Book Reviews
J. C. Sharman. Empires of the Weak: The Real Story of
European Expansion and the Creation of the New World Order.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019
Reviewed by Niv Horesh1
N.Horesh@westernsydney.edu.au
Division of Arts,Western Sydney University, Australia
Introduction
Warfare had undergone many revolutionary changes over the centuries. Hittite chariots,
for example, are said to have spread east and south bolstering aristocracies at the dawn
of urbanization some three thousand years ago. Then, the quality of swords and
armouries infinitely improved, as the infantry steadily took centre stage, and the Iron
Age swept across Eurasia and, later on, Africa. The Chinese invented the crossbow as
early as the 7th Century BCE, and Hannibal surprised the Romans with elephants few
centuries later.
Presaging modern conscription, the Greek city states lined up citizen hoplites in
impervious phalanxes during the Classical era, while the Caliphs later relied on slavesoldiers in no small measure. The Romans are credited, in turn, with elaborate
fortifications and catapults, and these later trans-morphed into the famous trace
italienne. Early Christianity is credited with the doctrine of just war (jus bellum justum),
and Confucianism with war aversion.
The Mongols famously used gunpowder, and the technology gradually spread from the
East Asia through the Islamic World to Europe. More importantly, they demonstrated
the importance of mounted archery skills. In the end, it was ironically gunpowder
weapons that would eradicate the danger to sedentary societies from nomads like the
Mongols themselves. What is more, the Mongols did not just impart knowledge but
learnt in fact a good deal from European siege methodology.2
On the high seas, the Byzantines famously employed oil explosives (“Greek fire”). The
Ottomans employed fast oared ships, and the Portuguese sailed fast ocean-going
carracks in the 1400s. Yet, at much the same time, the famous Zheng He fleet possessed
much bigger ocean-going ships, which was loaded with thousands of Chinese marines,
among other cargo. The seas were getting more crowded, but blue-water warfare was
rare until the 1600s.
1
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True, by uniquely mounting cannons on ships the Portuguese were able to gain a toehold
in far-flung corners of the planet. Recall the compass here: it was needed to get to those
corners but had actually been a Chinese invention. Peter Lorge therefore concludes that
early-modern warfare was actually a Chinese invention even if European armies
markedly grew in size in that era. To be sure, China developed a centralised taxation
system with which to fund its large standing army earlier. Recall here, too, that the
Chinese had actually invented gunpowder to begin with.
Clearly, innovation was not just Western but a two-way street throughout history. Yet,
Parker famously postulated in the 1990s that European warfare had been from the outset
distinct: it was technologically superior and expensive. So it was requiring a larger tax
revenue than elsewhere. The nub of the argument on European distinction defaults to
the consistent improvement of muskets and cannons, although Michael Roberts had
earlier in the 1950s also stressed innovative tactics. And more recently, Jeremy Black
also called attention to European cartography and intelligence gathering as superior.
In sum, Roberts showed that the distinction between Europe and “the rest” started
showing up in the 1500s with the advent of gunpowder technology, mercantilism and
high taxation. And as Charles Tilly would later famously conclude his study of earlymodern Europe, ‘wars made states and states made war’.
Nevertheless, since the 2000s, a growing chorus of scholars have cast doubts on the
extent to which European polities can be seen to be distinct. At first, the research onus
was on comparative standards of living, where early modern China was seen to be just
as affluent as Europe, according to Kenneth Pomeranz for example. From another
perspective, Robert Markley ably showed the misgivings that some early modern
European writers had about the status of Europe against that of the giant land empires
of Asia.
Lately, attention has shifted to warfare whereby scholars like Tonio Andrade have
admirably detailed the tenuousness of European presence in East Asia in the 1600s. Yet
even Andrade concedes that by the early 1800s, China had fallen so far behind the West
in gunpowder technology that it was easily defeated by Britain in the Opium War. True,
as Kaushik Roy suggests, the technological gap may have been smaller in India, and
gunpowder weapons may have not mattered on the battlefield there as much to begin
with. But India was considerably colonised, and closer to Europe than China.
Situating the Book Under Review
Herein Jason Sharman intervenes with a beautifully written and cogently argued book
exhorting us against reading too much 1800s history into the 1600s-1700s. For
Sharman gets to grips with his subject matter with both historical and social-science
acumen.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/20
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Echoing Pomeranz, Sharman posits that Europeans had no technological or institutional
advantage over Asian land empires before the Industrial Revolution even if Asian
polities were less interested in naval expansion. In other words, frequent wars in Europe
did not necessarily entail improved performance on the battleground elsewhere.
Barry Buzan and Richard Little would no doubt agree with Sharman that the
Westphalian system in Europe, created as it was as a result of the traumatic Thirty Years
War, is largely irrelevant to other parts of the world in terms of theory. That war and
modernity are conceptually so intertwined does call for a larger case-study palette.
However, as will soon become apparent, the emergence of the “national debt” economy
in Europe, which later spread around the world, undergirding an expansion of armies,
is one key dimension of the story largely absent in the book.
Sharman may also needlessly overstate the case against Eurocentrism when he writes
right at the outset that nothing interesting happened in Europe since Roman times. So
does his claim that, Atlantic slavery notwithstanding, Europeans and African rulers
were on equal terms in the 1500s (p. 49).
More to the point, Sharman also seems to be overstating the case when arguing that the
styles of warfare used by Europeans overseas were vastly different than at home, hence
whatever military revolution occurred in Europe could not matter that much elsewhere
(p. 4). To the contrary, one would be rather surprised to see Europeans using the same
methods everywhere given that they were vastly outnumbered in Asia until the 19th
Century, as he himself concedes. As late as 1740 there were, for example, only 2,000
troops employed by the East India Company (hereafter EIC, p. 87, p. 90).
Political correctness aside, is it not impressive that an organization like the EIC could
later occupy so much of India relying in no small measure on local sepoys? My own
research on British banking in Asia has led me to similar conclusions: Europe came to
dominate much of Asia relying in no small measure on Asian capital and Asian human
resources. The secret to power was thus as much institutional as technological. Ann
Carlos and Stephen Nicholas’ study is apposite here but it is not cited.
In Latin America, Europeans faced much lighter resistance, and Jared Diamond most
evocatively tells how epidemics had wiped out the Incas and Aztecs even before they
rose in arms. Vastly outnumbered, Diamond attributes the Conquistadors’ astonishing
triumph to the possession of guns and, to a lesser extent, horses. Recall, too, that no
civilization in the Americas used metal weapons. Sharman therefore infers that metal
swords and local allies mattered much more to the Spaniards than guns, drawing on the
very same Diamond (p. 5). In that sense, he is turning the Cortez and Pizarro occupation
stories on their respective heads.
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The shock-and-awe impact that Conquistador guns created cannot be erased from the
equation, precisely because – as Sharman notes – the Spaniards were so vastly
outnumbered (p. 39).
Anyone reading Diamond would agree that hand-to-hand fighting mattered too, and
here Spanish metal swords were infinitely better than obsidian or stone weapons used
by the locals. Spanish armoury was better than the cotton padding used by the locals.
The same applies once again to horses and pack animals, which the locals did not have
(outside llamas). But is all of that enough to disqualify the shock-and-owe effect?
Sharman resolutely cites John Guilmartin here to suggest the Spanish would have won
anyway even without gunpowder weapons (p. 41)!
The Muslim and Russian ‘Counterpoints’
Sharman rightly reminds us that the Ottomans were fairly adept at using gunpowder
weapons until the 1700s, and that this factor partly explains their success versus the
Mamluks and Safavids (p. 107). As Gábor Ágoston has shown, the Ottomans did
indeed not just import guns and cannons from Europe but also manufactured some
themselves. In the 16th century Ottoman mills could manufacture up to 1,000 metric
tons of gunpowder. By the end of the 18th Century imports made for the great bulk of
ordnance, however.3
Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) famously modernised Russia’s industry and army. He
newly mobilised peasants, and had experts brought from Western Europe with a view
toward acquiring the nous of manufacturing armaments independently. In 1705, the
English ambassador to Russia, Charles Whitworth, praised the quality of Russian
ammunition, and the country remained largely self-sufficient in that regard until the
1850s.4
The point, then, is that Western European military superiority over the Ottomans cannot
be established before 1750; neither perhaps can superiority be established over the
Russians before the Crimean War (p. 111-113). Modern arms cost states a lot. In
essence, Sharman asks how could Russian self-sufficiency be reconciled with its
refractory tax system and prevalence of serfdom? This is a thought-provoking question
but it remains the case that neither the Ottomans nor the Russians became ocean-going
powers, dominating global trade flows. Since the taxation of overseas trade was at the
heart of state formation in early-modern Europe, much fiscal revenue was therefore lost.

3

Gábor Ágoston (2005), Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the
Ottoman Empire (Cambridge University Press), p. 199, p. 160.
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Sharman draws on Giancarlo Casale to highlight, by way of contrast, the Ottoman
“powerful” navy, sailing as it did from Ethiopia right through to Sumatra; and the
Ottoman “central” taxation system (p. 100-101). Yet, as even Casale concedes,
Ottoman naval prowess waned as early as 1600. For its part, far from being centralised,
the Ottoman fiscal system increasingly relied on tax farming in the early modern era,
as Sevket Pamuk shows.
Recall here, too, that the Ottomans did not play any role whatsoever in stemming 1700s
Dutch encroachment into Java or even Aceh, where devout Muslims ruled. Ottoman
gunpowder technology may have spread in India earlier but that may not be the case for
Southeast Asia. Drawing on Sun Laichen, Sharman argues that much of mainland
Southeast Asia had adopted gunpowder weapons presumably from China well before
the Ottomans and Portuguese arrived.
To be sure, Pamuk’s work is cited in the book, but somehow interpretations lead in
different directions. For revisionists, the Ottoman Siege of Vienna in 1683 is, despite
ultimate Ottoman defeat, a demonstration of their singular military and fiscal prowess,
right at the heart of Europe. But conservative accounts point to the fact that CatholicProtestant tensions at the time meant the Holy Roman Empire had been subverted by
other European powers, and in that sense the Ottomans had been greatly assisted.
My own work highlights banks note issuance as a form of state debt that had been
invented in Song China but re-emerged in Sweden in the 17th century, that is to say well
before the Industrial Revolution. From then on, bank note issuance diffused quickly
across Northwestern Europe but reached Istanbul only in 1840. In stark contrast to
Western Europe, the US and Japan – less than 7 % of the Ottoman money supply was
made up by bank notes as late as 1914. Clearly, in relative terms, the Ottoman financial
system was lagging behind – this is not a 19th Century story read backwards. As already
mentioned, the story has a fiscal dimension too which, according to the Parker narrative,
translates into military shortfall.
If disease helped Europeans in the Americas, it held them back until the “New
Imperialism” of the 1800s in sub-Saharan Africa. Here, in the tropics, horses and pack
animals were of less use (pp. 35-36). Sharman is absolutely correct in drawing our
attention to the late colonization of Africa, a continent that was after all on Europe’s
doorstep.
Curiously, African gold and slave markets were approached by sea. Overland,
Europeans would have had to traverse the Maghreb but there was vehement Muslim
resistance there that made the idea impossible. After all, Portugal itself was partly
occupied by Muslims until the 1400s.
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When the Portuguese did forcefully try to invade the Maghreb like in the Battle of
Alcazarquivir of 1578, they were resoundingly defeated amid heavy artillery from both
sides. What is more, the Portuguese King Sebastian was killed in battle; the Spaniards
would invade Portugal, and the Ottomans would increasingly be involved in the
Maghreb thereafter (p. 48, p. 114).
At this juncture, Sharman insightfully points to Oman as another very important spoiler
of European expansion. In 1661 Omani naval forces aided by local collaborators
wrested Mombasa from the Portuguese, and would later take over Zanzibar too. In
1668, Omanis sacked the Portuguese fort as far away as Diu (p. 54, p. 58).
In sum, Sharman shows there was a lot of gunpowder in use in North Africa. The
traditional narrative foregrounds, for example, Mamluk (and Japanese) reluctance to
embrace firearms, and in that sense Sharman provides a powerful corrective. He even
suggests Mamluk-made guns reached Western India in 1500 (p. 74). But, notably, Peter
Mundy who visited India in the 1630s, did not describe in his famous travelogue any
guns used by Mughal soldiers.
India and China Revisited: the Religious Card
Religion played its part not just in Vienna. Sharman rightly mentions the Ottomans
were tolerant of religious minorities, and in that sense they presaged perhaps social
modernity. He also insightfully shows how the Portuguese conspired from the 1500s
with Hindu principalities against Muslim attacks, as was the case in Goa in 1510.
Ottoman contact with, on the other hand, the Muslim principalities in Sumatra come
across as rather feeble (p. 58).
For revisionists, ‘Vienna on sea’ is the 1509 Battle of Diu in modern Gujarat. There,
1,500 Portuguese faced an “unlikely” but large fighting coalition of sea-seasoned
Mamluks, Ottomans and even Catholic Venetians, as well as local Indians (p. 57-58).
But the nub of the matter is that the Portuguese actually won, thus entrenching their
partial domination of the spice trade. And yet Sharman stresses what he sees as
subsequent Ottoman inroads into the spice trade, and domination of the Red Sea.
Frankopan suggest he may be right as, shorn of some revenue, the Portuguese turned
their attention also to cotton and silk import.5
If Diu was a triumph, the Portuguese lost their grip on the all-important entrepot of
Hormuz in 1622 (p. 83). Here, the usurper was the Protestant English with Safavid
assistance, which brings to mind Rhoads Murphey’s famous argument about the
English singular ability to entice the right Asian rulers to their side at the right time.

5
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In keeping with this argument, the French support for the Mughals against the EIC
during the famous 1757 Battle of Plassey came to nothing.
Sharman claims that the Ming navy drowned interloping Portuguese ships between
1521-22 (pp. 129-130). But the picture is more complicated. Actually, by 1557 the
Portuguese were able to establish a permanent settlement in Macau through kickback
to local officials and, importantly, by demonstrating their vitality to the Ming as
counter-piracy agents and as cannon makers. Macao’s survival in the face of local and
intra-European (mainly Dutch) pressures is a testament to the ingenuity of the
Portuguese sea empire. On the other hand, the Ming were defeated by the Qing even
though the latter had fewer cannons, thus reinforcing Sharman’s point about the
irrelevance of European technology on the Asia battle field.
It’s the Economics
Pooling private capital through enhanced property rights was key to European
ascendancy in the early modern era. In that sense, joint-stock trading companies like
the EIC, or its Dutch competitor the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie), were
great innovations. Yet, strangely, Sharman seems to read weakness into the EIC and
VOC precisely because of their joint-stock nature as compared with the more statist but
less dynamic colonization effort by the Portuguese (Estado do India) and the French
(Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes Orientales). That is to say, statism
strangely equates with modernity in Sharma’s narrative but not necessarily with military
strength or profitability for that matter (p. 69).
Actually, as Sharman himself shows (p. 53), all European ‘India’ companies enjoyed
official backing to one degree or another, including the Spanish Casa de Contratación.
All enticed private capital to one degree or another, in return for limited trading rights.
And even though Sharman sweepingly deprecates the profitability of those companies,
they delivered massive revenue to their governments. The Habsburgs otherwise
creamed off much of the silver bonanza discretely scooped up by encomiendas across
Latin America by way of financing war against the Protestant Dutch (p. 66).
On its part, the VOC is said to have seen sharp decline in profits over the course of the
18th Century due to rising military and administrative costs (p.80). Yet, it is implicitly
accepted that the VOC successfully drew much tax revenue from peasants deep into
Java, not just from trade. After the Battle of Plassey, one can point to similar taxfarming success by the EIC in India (pp. 91-92) but the quantitative data are sorely
lacking in both cases. Certainly, in their The First Modern Economy, Jan de Vries and
Ad van der Woude give a very different impression about VOC and EIC profitability
compared with Sharman.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

7

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 83 [2020], No. 83, Art. 20

182

Number 83, Fall 2020

Profits sometimes tell only part of the story anyway. The EIC and VOC apparatus in
the region helped convey the best of Asian technology to European master artisans.
Thus, both Delft and Stoke-on-Trent boasted a sophisticated china industry in the early
17th century. Lord Macartney was famously rebuffed by the Qianlong Emperor in 1793
because China was supposedly self-sufficient, and did not need British mechanical
clockwork. The British were portrayed in turn as slavishly reliant on quintessentially
Chinese imports like tea, silk and ceramics. What historians rarely appreciate is that
Macartney also brought along British-made ceramics to impress the locals. In other
words, Europeans in the early modern age copied technology faster than the other way
around even at a time when they were not sufficiently militarily strong to open the
region for trade.
The VOC and EIC adapted to local taxation norms, but paid their governments
handsomely for the chartered trading privileges they received. As argued above,
Europe came to dominate much of Asia relying in no small measure on Asian capital
and Asian human resources. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the EIC
borrowed heavily from local creditors so as to finance its military build-up in keeping
with European norms. Indeed, EIC’s debt-to-revenue ratio rose from 120 % in 1793 to
over 300 % in 1809! (p. 94) This is a marker of modernity not of weakness, as all
European governments trod a similar fiscal path of “national debt”, and the EIC was
after all a state within a state
More generally, after 1500, commercial rather than land taxes gradually became the
main source of revenue for European governments. Income tax did not become a
significant contributor until the 20th Century, while customs and duties made for the
lion share beforehand. It is no accident that Europeans set their eyes on the Ottoman
and Qing customs service later in the 19th Century.
In that sense, none of the land empires surveyed by Sharman passes muster. Of course
there were differences among them: Russia had a strong feudal aristocracy, whilst slavesoldiers were rife in the Islamic world. But apart from China, where the tax burden was
light and the levy system centralised, all those empires relied to one degree or another
on tax farming with high intermediary costs. As Gennaioli and Voth observe,
increasingly heavy tax loads underpin economic modernity. For commercial tax
receipts to grow commerce had to grow, so EIC and VOC importance also hinges on
custom payments, not just charter fees.
The costs of waging war so far away from the metropole were surely prohibitive. Here,
Patrick O’Brien comes to mind with his famous conclusions that ‘empire’ did not pay
off to the British although his focus was the 19th Century. In fact, drawing on Lorge,
Sharman rightly contends exorbitant outlays were the reason why the Ming gave up on
naval expansion in the 15th Century (p. 133-138).
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But the wider implication that the various East India companies set up by European
powers were loss making is wanting at best. As argued above, these companies’
operation yielded many largely positive externalities from a metropolitan perspective.
Concluding Remarks
The persistent rise of China and “all the rest” in the 21st Century re-positions the
conventional story of European exceptionalism. It calls for reassessment of what some
may see as a short moment in history, disconfirming hackneyed scripts of
modernisations. Indeed, why should we assume frequent warfare is a desirable setting
to begin with, where China and India offer alternative pre-modern ‘modernities’. As
we saw above, even with the best of weapons, Europeans did not always win on the
battle front. And Sharman might even add that non-Western powers who sought to
emulate Western warfare sometimes made themselves more vulnerable.
Vastly inferior in technological terms, Vietnam was able to defeat the mighty US in the
20th Century. In that sense, Sharman's caution about the suitability of technology to
local conditions seems justified. So, too, is his emphasis on learning being a two-way
street. Yet, the scholarly conversation on the so-called Military Revolution must entail
a fiscal dimension and robust quantitative analysis. The emergence of the “national
debt” economy in Europe, which later spread around the world, undergirding an
expansion of armies, is key to the story.
The Westphalian system in Europe is largely irrelevant to other parts of the world in
terms of theory because it emerged from an intense distinct warfare setting. Sharman
is right, then, to call for more non-Western historical case studies to enrich our
understanding of international relations. He powerfully observes (pp. 150-1):
A more cosmopolitan, less ethnocentric perspective, giving due weight to regions
beyond Europe, shows Western dominance of the international system as relatively
fleeting, and thus makes it much less surprising if this dominance is now being
challenged with the rise of powers beyond the West.
The book makes good on its promise by delivering precisely that perspective. In
passing, it also unpacks many historical conjunctures that have been scarcely discussed
thus far, like the role religion played in early-modern empire building. What emerges
is exceedingly cogent story, but one that often relies on narrow perusal of the pertinent
secondary sources. If Sharman’s attention to the Maghreb as a ‘counterfactual’ is
enlightening, his reconstruction of the Diamond story on the other end of the spectrum
is troubling. In between, lie for the most part the Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal and MingQing China. All willingly used guns: China invented gunpowder to begin with, and the
Ottomans copiously manufactured gunpowder weapons. Yet, by 1700 all those empires
heavily relied on Western munitions expertise. The rest is open to debate.
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